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J The New Structure of the
Housing Finance System
FTER 25 YEARS OF ECONOMIC evolution
and 15 years of political turmoil, the U.S. housing
finance system has changed in fundamentalways,
and the structure of the new system is becoming
apparent. The system is still intended to allocate
credit to housing and hold mortgage rates below
theirfree-market level, but this subsidy is provided
through different institutional arrangements. The
dominant institutions are now extremely large
government-sponsored enterprises (GSEs) which
operate in the secondary mortgage market, issuing
securities that arebacked by mortgages aM buying
mortgages originated by other institutions, They
have taken the place of small local savings and
loan associations which make loans directly to
homebuyers and hold the mortgages intheir own
portfolios. The cost of the subsidy falls on tax-
payers who bear the risk of failure by the GSEs.
The public purpose ofgovernment intervention
in the housing finance system has always been to
promote homeownership, giving force to a social
preference that derives from a widely held but
rarely analyzed belief that homeowners are better
citizens, because they “have a stake in society.”
Subsidies are appropriate because families will
not take this social benefit into account in deciding
whether to buy a home. The system also has two
subsidiary goals: (1) countercyclical support for
housing production; and (2) geographic equity
(as defined by public policy) in the mortgage
market. The latter is more directly related to the
purpose of promoting homeownership.
Achieving these purposes is the responsibility
mainly ofprivately owned institutions which are
supposed to meet them while maximizing profit
and avoiding direct cost to taxpayers. This is also
true of the major housing finance agencies within
the federal government; they do not normally
receive funds from the U.S. Treasury. The private
as well as public institutions operate under
statutes which define their powers, limitations
and privileges, and delineate what they can hold
as assets and liabilities. To some extent, they
compete against each other.
The home mortgage market consists of some
$3 trillion of household debt, nearly all of it
held by private institutions, of which more than
$1 trillion is explicitly or implicitly guaranteed
by the federal government (not counting deposit
insurance). There is continuing tension between
the public purposes of the system and the safety
and soundness—and profits—of the privately
owned institutions that predominate in it.
This paper first describes the present structure
of the housing finance system, contrasting it with
the traditional system and explaining why the
system has changed. It concludes with a discus-
sion of the major issues that will face public policy
over the next few years.48
THE CURRENT SYSTEM
Mortgage and Housing Markets
The mortgage market has traditionally been
separate from other capital markets, because
mortgages differ in key respects from other debt
instruments. A home mortgage is a loan to an
individual or couple for the purpose of buying
a particular house, The amount the lender is
willing to loan depends on the value of the prop-
efly. The mortgagor promises to repay the loan
over time, Ifhe or she fails to do so, thus default-
ing on the mortgage, the lender can foreclose,
take title to the property, and sellit to someone
else. The default risk (also termed credit risk)
depends on changes in the value of the property
and in the circumstances of the owner, such as
job loss, divorce, or the death of a husband or
wife. The extent ofloss in the event of default
depends on changes iii property values. Real
estate markets are local markets, so evaluating
a particular piece of property requires local
expertise. For these reasons, mortgages have
traditionally been illiquid; investors have been
willing to buy them only ifthey have the know!-
edge required to evaluate them.
The standard mortgage instrument—until the
1980s, almost the oniy mortgage instrument—is
a fixed-rate, level-payment, long-term, self-amor-
tizing loan. The term usually runs for 30 years.
Such mortgages carry prepayment risk as well as
default risk. The term can he shortened only at
the option of the borrower, by prepaying the loan.
Ifmarket interest rates fall, as happened most
recently during 1993-94, mortgagors are likely
to prepay their loans and refinance their homes
at a lower interest rate. Ifrates rise, mortgagors
are unlikely to prepay unless they are moving,
and lenders will find themselves earning be1ow~
market rates on their mortgage portfolios. Thus,
lenders bear the risk ofadverse movements in
interest rates. This was a particular problem
during the inflation of the late 1970s, As a result,
mortgages with adjustable rates (ARMs) wore
authorized and became common in the early
lOBOs, A variety of other new instruments also
have come into existence, such as balloon mort-
gages, which are not fully amortized overtheir
term, and graduated payment mortgages, which
carry fixed interest rates but have lower payments
in the early years, The traditional standard
mortgage remains the most common, although
its popularity relative to ARMs has varied as
interest rates have fluctuated. Fixed-rate mort-
gages are more popular among borrowers when
the general level of interest rates is low and
ARMs are more popular when the level is high.
The dominant position ofthe standard mort-
gage developed under the auspices of the federal
government, specifically the Federal Housing
Administration (FHA), which was created in the
1930s to insure home mortgages. Buyers pay a
mortgage insurance premium to FHA, and in
return FHA guarantees that lenders will receive
payment of the outstanding principal balance on
the mortgage in the event of default and foreclo-
sure, FHA is required by law to operate on an
actuarially sound basis; its insurance premiums
are supposed to cover its losses and operating
costs. Once FHA demonstrated the viability and
profitability of such mortgages, the “FHA mort~
gage” also became the norm for conventional
mortgages (those not insured or guaranteed by a
government agency).
Primary Lenders
The local nature ofreal estate markets has
meant that mortgage lenders have traditionally
been local institutions. The most important
have been the savings and loan associations
(S&Ls), both in terms of their share of the mort-
gage market and the share of mortgages in their
portfolios. The S&Ls started as local specialized
mortgage portfolio lenders, obtaining deposits
from “small savers” within their ‘ocality and
making mortgage loans there also, Until 1983
their lending areas were geographically limited
by statutes and regulation. Typically, their
deposits have been locally generated as well,
though there has been no geographic limitation
on liabilities. Mutual savings banks, concentrat-
ed in the Northeast, are similar to S&Ls as spe-
cialized mortgage portfolio lenders, but they
developed independently and started with a dif-
ferent purpose: to provide a range of financial
services to households. Savings banks and S&Ls
together are usually termed “thrifts.” They have
access to the national capitth markets through
the Federal Home Loan Bank System, a set of 12
regional Federal Home Loan Banks which they
own. Chartered and regulated by the federal
government, the Flame Loan Banks are able to
borrow at preferential rates in the capital mar-
kets. Commercial banks also hold a significant
share of home mortgages, but mortgages com-
prise aminor fraction of their assets. Until 1989
they could not belong to the Home Loan Bank
System; they now can if their mortgage holdings
are largeenough.
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S&Ls, mutual savings banks and commercial
banks are primary lenders; they originate mort-
gages which they hold in their own portfolios.
A large number of mortgages, however, are origi-
nated by mortgage bankers, for immediate sale
in the secondary market to an investor who
expects to hold them. Mortgage bankers make
their money from fees for originating mortgages
and often for servicing them, collecting the
monthly payments and transmitting them to
the investor. Mortgage banking developed as
an important component of the housing finance
system when FHA began to insure mortgages.
FHA insurance and its uniform national under-
writing standards meant that specialized know!-
edge of local housing markets was less important
for investors. Mortgage bankers have since
developed the skills necessary to originate
conventional mortgages and now originate
just under half of all home mortgages.
Securitization and the Governrnent~
Sponsored Enterprises
The limitations of mortgages as investment
vehicles led to the creation of mortgage-backed
securities (MBSs) beginning in 1970, Mortgage
securitization consists of combining a group of
mortgages into a pooi and selling shares in the
poni to investors. This spreads the risk of default
over a number ofmortgages and allows investors
to calculate the probability of default for the
mortgages in the pooi with more accuracy than
for any individual mortgage. The earliest and
simplest MBSs are known as pass-through secu-
rities; the servicer collects principal and interest
payments and passes them through, without
taxation, to the investor.
The pass-through security does not reduce
prepayment risk. More recent forms, the
Collateralized Mortgage Obligation (GMO) and
the Real Estate Moitgage Investment Conduit
(REMIC), partition the principal cash flow from
a pooi of mortgages or MBSs into maturity class-
es, or tranches. Eachinvestor receives a propor-
tionate share of all interest payments. Principal
payments are allocated in full as they occur to
each tranche in turn, starting with the shortest-
maturity tranche, Tranches are separately
priced and sold to investors with different time
horizons. Investors in the longer-term tranches
incur greater interestrate risk, but have some
protection against prepayment. They are not,
however, protected in the event ofa protracted
decline in interest rates; ifmortgagors prepay in
largenumbers, the securities will be redeemed.
This type of security was developed in 1983 and
it now accounts for about half of all mortgages
that are securitized)
Securitization has broadened the mortgage
market by creating instruments that appeal to
investors without special knowledge of local
housing markets. The payment streams are sim-
ilar to bonds, and the consequences of default
and prepayment are minimized.
Until the last fewyears, the market for MBSs
has generally required a government guarantee
on the mortgages, the securities, or both.
Securitization was developed by a government
agency, the Government National Mortgage
Association (GNMA or Ginnie Mae). GNMA
issued pass-through securities based on pools
ofFHA-insured mortgages, and added its own
guarantee oftimely payment of principal and
interest to the FHA guarantee of principal pay-
ment in case of default. (GNMAalso issues
securities backed by pools of mortgages guaran-
teed by VA, originally the Veterans
Administration and now the Department of
Veterans Affairs, in a program created after
World War II and modeled on FHA.)
The other major MBS guaTantors are the housing
GSEs: the Federal National Mortgage Association
(FNMA or Fannie Mae) and the Federal Home
Loan Mortgage Corporation (FHLMC or Freddie
Mac).2 Both also buy and hold mortgages in their
own portfolios, financing them by issuing debt
securities in the capital markets, and in factthey
have the first- and fourth-largest mortgage port-
folios, respectively, of all mortgage lenders in the
United States. They are secondary market agen-
cies; they do not originate mortgages but buy
loans from primary lenders or mortgage bankers.
ENMA and FHLMC are privately owned insti-
tutions with stockholders and private boards,
but they are federally chartered corporations
with a variety of special privileges, and the
President appoints five members out of is to the
board of each one. The most important of the
privileges are exemption from state and local
The collateral for CMOsand REMICs can be either whole
mortgages or MBSs. Thus, the ratio of CMOsand REMICS
to afi MBSs does not represent &ther theirshare of all MBSs
2 ONMA can also be considered a GSE, but Rs fully owned
by the tedera} government and operates as an agency wfthin
HOD, as is FHA.
or their share of all securitized mortgages.50
income taxes, exemption from Securities and
Exchange Commission registration and state
securities laws, the ability to borrow $2.25 bil-
lion from the U.S. Treasury in an emergency,
and the fact that their debt securities are ‘quali-
fied investments” for regulated financial institu-
tions. Their securities are also issuable and
payable through Federal Reserve Banks.3
These privileges give them ‘agency status” in
the capital markets, a general perception that the
government will stand behind them. This per-
ception is reinforced by the factthat both are
very large financial institutions, “too big to fail.”
Agency status allows them to borrowat relatively
low rates and to issue or guarantee payment on
securities based on pools ofconventional mort-
gages. The market treats their guarantees of
timely payment of principal and interest as
equivalent to a government guarantee.4
The Role ~fthe Federal Government
It should be clear that the federal government
has a large role in the housing finance system. It
insures some mortgages; it issues securities
backed by pools of those mortgages; and it has
chartered corporations which are believed in the
capital markets to have an implicit government
guarantee behind their debt securities and their
mortgage securities. In addition, it regulates and
insures the deposits of primary lenders, and has
chartered institutions which provide them with
access to the capital markets. The federal go~’-
ernment is generally credited with conducting
three successful social experiments in the mort-
gage market: demonstrating the feasibility of
long-term, self-amortizing loans; mortgage insur-
ance; and securitization. In all three cases, the
private sector has successfully copied the feder-
al models. The FHA mortgage became the stan-
dard for conventional mortgages, and a private
mortgage insurance industry has developed to
insure them. The private sector now accounts
for more business than the federal government
in both instances. The demonstration that secu~
ritization is feasible has been followed by a sub-
stantial volume ofprivate MBS activity only
since about 1990, however, and private securi-
ties are still a small part of the total market.
The Dividing Lines
The federal government also demarcates the
market segments ofthe various institutions by
means of two statutory numerical concepts: the
FHA ceiling and the conforming loan limit.
The FHA ceiling is the maximum principal
balance on a mortgage that FHA caninsure. The
ceiling is set in law in nominth dollars; since
1980 higher amounts have been allowed in areas
with higher housing costs. The present ceiling
is $67,500, or 95 percent of the area median
home price ifthat is higher, up to a maximum of
$151,725. The maximum is still less than 95
percent of the area median home price in a num-
ber of large markets, among them New York and
the largest metropolitan areas on the \Vest Coast,
and it is raised every fewyears.
FHA insurance is intended for the first-time
homebuyer who can only afford a relatively
small down payment, and who thus poses a
greater risk of default to the lender, Most FHA
buyers make a down payment of five percent or
Iess,~Below the ceiling, nearly all low down
payment loans are insured by FHA and securi-
tized by GNMA.
The conforming loan limit is the maximum
principal amount of a mortgage that FNMAand
FHLMC can buy. Before 1974, they were
restricted to mortgages with principal amounts
below the FHA ceiling. A higher limit was set
by statute in that year. In 1977 the limit was set
at 25 percent above the maximum mortgage
amount for S&Ls, and both were raised in 1979.
After the S&L maximum was abolished in 1980,
the conforming loan limit was set by statute at
its then-current value of $93,750, and indexed
on the basis ofthe annual percentage change in
the mean price of homes hough~with conven-
tional mortgages. Since 1980, the limit has been
about 37 percent above the mean price. In 1993
Most of these privUeges date back n some form to the
FNMA Charter Act of 1954 or its nRial 1938 charter. In 1970
the same prM~eges were extended to FHLMC when ft was
created.
The securfties may be issued directly bya GSE or alterna-
fively bya subsidiary of a private entity such as a Wall Street
firm, with the GSE guaranteeing the Umely payment of prin-
cip& and interest.
These statements are based on unpublished tabu[aüons of
FHA-insured loans between 1989 and 1992. The tabula-
fans differ from published data because FHA aflows part
(before 1991 aH) of the dosing costs to be financed n the
mortgage, as is discussed n Price Waterhouse (1990, pp.
18-19). The published data do not adjust the oan-to-value
ratios to reflect financing of dosing costs, and therefore
show somewhat lower oan-to-value ratios. For example,
Pñce Waterhouse (1990, p. 17), reportsthat n 1988-89
shqhtly less than half of FHA-insured mortgagors had oan-
to-va’ue ratios above 95 percent.51
the conforming loan limit was $203,150, while
the mean price was $144,000!’
Because of their agency status and the perception
that they are toobig to fail, the GSEscan offer
lower interest rates than the S&Ls and therefore
dominate the market below the conforming loan
limit. Estimates of their cost advantage are in
the range of 20 to 35 basis points.7
The S&Ls remain as portfolio lenders above the
conforming loan limit. Be’ow the limit, they
operate largely as mortgage bankers. They origi-
nate mortgages not for their own portfolios but
for sale to the GSEs, although they may buy back
the securities issued on apool of the mortgages
that they have sold. Regulations issued under
the Financial Institutions Reform, Recovery and
Enforcement Act of 1089 (FIRREA) gave the
S&Ls an incentive to move away from portfolio
lending by setting capital requirements only 40
percent as high against MBSs issued by the
GSEs as against whole mortgages. Other thrifts
and commercial banks have a similar role.
The mortgage market, therefore, can be divided
into the FHA/ GNMA submarket, for low down
payment loans below the FHA ceiling; the GSE
submarket, for most other loans below the con-
forming loan limit; and the “jumbo” submarket,
occupied by S&Ls, otherthrifts and commercial
banks, for loans above the conforming loan limit.
Actual market segmentation, however, is less
c1ear~cutthan the dollar demarcations suggest.
The FHA ceiling oniy applies to FHA. The
GSEs, the S&Ls and any other lender can originate
mortgages below the ceiling, and some such loans
are made. To some extent, the private mortgage
insurers compete with FHA by offering insurance
on loans with low down payments, though they
do not insure a large share ofthese mortgages.
Similarly, the conforming loan limit applies
only to the GSEs. The S&Ls and other primary
lenders can make loans below the limit. But the
conforming loan limit is much less restrictive on
the GSEs than the FHA ceiling is on FHA. Since
house prices in most years rise at least modestly,
mortgages that were above the limit when issued
may be below it a few years later. Thus, the
share of the market open to the GSEs is larger
when measured in terms of all outstanding
mortgages than it is when measured in terms of
mortgages originated in the current year.
Primary lenders do make loans be’ow the con-
forming loan limit. Some are nonstandard loans
which the GSEs do not choose to purchase, but
mortgages above as well as below the limit are
likely to be underwritten to the guidelines ofthe
GSEs, to keep open the option of selling them in
the secondary market.
In addition, the conforming loan limit appar~
ently only adjusts in one direction. Declining
house prices during 1993 resulted in a reduction
of $6,050 in the calculated conforming loan
limit for 1994, as reported by the Federal
Housing Finance Board. FNMAand FHLMC
announced that they would not lower the limit,
because the 1980 statute referred oniy to
“increases,” and not to “decreases” or
“changes”8 HUD Secretary Henry Cisneros, as
GSE regulator, first challenged this action and
then accepted it.
THE GROWING DOMINANCE OF
THE GSEs
The GSEs have been the thriving and expand-
ing institutions in the system. In 1992, the latest
year for which full data are available, FHA and
VA loans were about 10 percent ofthe total dol-
lar volume of all home mortgages issued, non-
conforming loans about 20 percent, and conven-
tional conforming loans about 70 percent. The
dominant role of FNMAand FHLMC in the con-
forming loan market is reflected by the factthat
they securitized overhalf of these loans and
added to their mortgage portfolios as well.
The growth of the GSEs is shown in Table 1,
which depicts the mortgage market in terms of
the total dollar volume of loans outstanding at
various dates. The GSEs now hold or securitize
about 30 percent of the total, compared to about
7percent in 1980. Since 1980 they have accounted
° The annua’ adjustment s based on the percentage change
n prices of homes sold during the ast five business days in
October.
See, for example, CF (1990) and Henclershoti and ShiHing
(1989). The former estimates a differential of 23 basis
points as of 1987, the Eatter 30 to 35 basis points as of 1986.
Both apply to oans that are at east 15 percent above the
conforming oan limit and! therefore, un~ikely to be sold in
the secondary market when they are seasoned. These are
apparently the most recent analyses.
o The staff director of the Senate Housing Subcommitteeas of
1980 has stated that the intent of the statute was that the
limit shou’d move in accord with house prices in both direc-
fions, but prices had risen so long and so much by 1980 that
nobody remembered the possibility of a decrease when the
biU was written.52
FHA and VA insure or guarantee a gradually
declining share of home mortgages, as Table 2
shows. It is not feasible to calculate noncon-
forming loans as a fraction of the outstanding
stock ofmortgages at any given time. The non-
conforming market has been stable at about 20 to
22 percent of all conventional mortgages origi-
nated in a given year, measured in terms ofdollar
volume, but there has been a fairly steady
shrinkage when measured in terms of thenumber
of mortgages, from 11,6 percent in 1984 to 6.4 per-
TabLe 1
Single-Family Mortgage Debt Outstanding, 1968-92(end~of-year values)
Dollar Values (billions of currentdollars) Percent Shares
1968 1980 1989 199~ 1SSB 1980 1989 1992
Portfolio lending Portfolio lenWng
FF4MA portfolio 75 29 1 124 FNMA portfolio 26 54 3~8 42
FHLMCportfolto 0 4 18 31 FHLMCparttoRG 00 04 07 tO
S&Ls 110 411 512 375 S$eLs 413 426 213 127
Commercial banks 39 160 33~ 452 C~nmeriatbanks 141 166 *40 1$ a
Others 109 229 529 591 Others 4t1 237 221) 200
Subtotal 265 85S 1486 1573 Subtotal 1000 887 61 7 533
SecuritY hOldin4V Security hotdtngt’
S&Ls 0 27 200 159 S&Ls 00 ZG 83 54
Commecc~a~ banks 0 20 129 307 Commercra banks 00 1 G 54 i~ 4
Others 1) 63 592 914 Others 00 65 246 SI 0
SubtotS 0 110 921 1380 Subtota’ 00 114 382 487
Securtttes ~ssued Securities issuer
FNAMAMBSs 0 0 220 436 ENMAMBSs 00 ca ai 14.8
FHLMCPCs 01 4 268 402 FHLMCPCs 00 1 11.1 iae
GNMAMB$~ 09 2 358 411 00 9.5 149 13$
Private paSs C) 4 77 132 Prwate pools 00 0.4 32 4.5
Subtotaf C hG 921 1380 Subtotal 00 114 382 467
Total 265 965 2408 2954
Others~ncIude mutual savingsbanks We insurance companies finance companies the Farmers Home Adrn~nistrat~on, the
Fede a~ Housnig AcJnitntstrafion the Veterans Administration (Department ofVeterans Affair tn 1989 and ater) mortgage
comparnes, re& e tate rwestmenttrusts state and ~acaI crethtagencies state andbeat retirementfunds, noniMured pension
funds cretht unions other U $ governmentagencies, andindividua’s
Security hetdtngs show the thstribution ofsecurities~stied Ethercan be addedtu porttoko~endrngdata to obtainthetotals,
both cannotbe added wfthout double counting Security holdings can be added to data on portfolio tenthng to showmortgage
market activrty ofthrifts banks and other institutoris seourthesissued canbe addedto dataon portlohotending to show mort
gage market activity ofthe GSEs
SOURCES’ Board ofGovernors US Department ofHousing and Urban Development Inside Mortgage Capital Markets, In ide
Mortgage Secunues Savings andLoan FactSoak
for over 40 percent of the net increase; since 1989,
over 70 percent This is nearly the entire con
ventional conforming loan market. The new
interpretation of the conforming loan limit allows
them to further increase their market share.
cent in 1993. Even the stable dollar share of
annual originations implies a declining share
of all mortgages outstanding, as the conforming
loan limit rises from year to year.
The housing finance system is an emerging
duopoly, dominated by the two large GSEs.
Other institutions are increasingly limited to
segments of the market which are effectively
barred to the GSEs by statute, and which are
declining in importance.
The dominant position of the GSEs is rein-
forced by their relationship to other market
institutions. Thrifts and banks are both their
competitors and their customers. They compete
as portfolio lenders, but atthe same time they sell




1968 1980 1989 1992
Dottar Values
(b000nsofcurrentdollars)
A-IA 51 94 263 326
VA 34 102 157 164
Conventional 180 770 1968 2464
Total 265 965 2408 295-4
PercentShares
Fl-IA 1&2 97 11$ 110
VA 128 106 65 5.6
CoriventionaF 679 79 8 81 7 834
Source- Oept. ofHousing &Urban Development, Swvey of
Mortgage LendingActivity.
mortgages to the GSEs andbuy mortgage securities
from them, and also buy the debt securities that
the GSEs use to finance their portfolios.
THE TRADITIONAL SYSTEM:
A COMPARISON
This is very different from the housing finance
system as it existed about 25 years ago. In 1968 it
was still recognizably the New Deal system. It was
dominated by the S&Ls,which gathered deposits
locally, borrowed from the Home Loan Banks
during recessions or when rates were high, and
made long-term, fixed-rate loans (up to a maxi-
mum of$40,000) on homes located within 50
miles of their home offices (100 miles after 1964),
The Federal Home Loan Bank Board (the Bank
Board) regulated and supervised both the S&Ls
and the Home Loan Banks, and insured the S&Ls
through the Federal Savings and Loan Insurance
Corporation (the FSLIC).
FHA was losing business to the S&Ls, and at
the same time taking on greater credit risk,
because of the growing private mortgage insur-
ance industry. FHA had a single premium for
all loans; on the “principle of cross-subsidization,”
profits on the less risky loans were supposed to
subsidize losses on those with higher loan-to-value
ratios. The outcome was that FHA lost the better
loans to the conventional market, because private
mortgage insurers could charge a lower premium
on the less risky Ioans,°
The oniy secondary market agency was FNMA,
established in 1938 as a fufly governmental
agency and limited to FHA and VA mortgages.
Its purpose was to smooth out the flow of mort-
gage credit, overtime and between places.
Securitization had not yet been invented; FNMA
issued bonds and bought mortgages from primary
lenders and mortgage bankers. It was supposed
to be a dealer, selling as well as buying mortgages.
It had begun to operate as a portfolio lender in
the post-war period, however, buying VA mort-
gages in particular, until directed to liquidate its
portfolio by the 1954 FNMACharter Act. Its
portfolio then fluctuated between $2 billion and
$3 billion until 1965. At that point it again
began to buy mortgages in large volume. Its
portfolio reached $7 billion in 1965, less than
3 percent of the total market.
This system was considered a success in terms
ofits policy objectives. Housing production
reached unprecedented levels in the post-war
period; the pre-war peak of 937,000 housing
starts in 1925 was eclipsed in 1946 and indeed
in all later years. There was also a remarkable
increase in homeownership, from 44 percent of
all households in ‘1940 to 55 percent in 1950
and 62 percent by 1960. Total home mortgage
debt doubled in the first five years after the war
and doubled again in the next five years. Not all
the goals were met; regional differences in mort-
gage rates probably did not diminish, but this
was a secondary concern.10 Contemporary econ-
omists were divided over whether the housing
finance system was a major contributor to these
outcomes, or whether the same results could
have been reached some other way, but as a policy
matter the system was credited with the successes
that occurred)l
This paragraph is based on Kaserrnan (1977).
10 See Fredrikson (1971) and the data and literature therein
cited on changes n regional differentials. Actual average
mortgage rates varied by about 1 percentage point between
the Northeast at the ow end and the South and West at the
high end, and may have risen slightly between 1940 and
1963. These rates are not risk-adjusted, but Fredrikson
makes adjustments for loan-to-value raUo and term,and
finds they have Uttle effect on the region& differentfals.
Grebler. Blank and Winnick (1956) argue that the changes in
the housing finance system were important; Saffinier,
Ha~crow and Jacoby (1958) conc$ude they were not.54
Several problems were inherent in this system,
and by the late lOGOs it was already starting to
break down. The S&Ls were expected toincur
interest rate risk routinely. They borrowed short
and they had to lend long. Ifinterest rates rose,
their cost offunds would rise faster than the
earnings on their long-term mortgage portfolios.
Second, they operated under a kind of one-way
Glass-Steagall Act. They had no protection from
competition on either side of the balance sheet.
They could issue only time deposits and had to
specialize in home mortgages. Commercial
banks could, however, also issue time deposits
and make mortgage loans. Third, the geographic
lending restrictions meant that S&Ls incurred
creditrisk from local as well as national eco-
nomic changes. This had already occurred
on a large scale when the Florida land boom
collapsed in the late 1920s)2
CHANGES IN THE SYSTEM
All these potential problems became real
ones after 1965 and forced changes in the system.
The disintegration that began with the onset of
inflation in the late lOGOs has been described
and analyzed by many economists:~ In this paper
oniy a brief review of the process of change is
necessary. Table I traces its course. It shows
the importance of different institutions in the
mortgage market in 1968, as the New Deal system
was starting to unravel: in 1980, when policy-
makers were forced to recognize that the S&Ls
could no longer function as portfolio senders in
an inflationary world; in 1989, when FIRREA
was passed to address the losses of the S&Ls and
the insolvency of the FSLIC; and in 1992, the
latest year for which information is available.
Inflation and the Decline of the S&Ls
The S&Ls remained the dominant institutions
in the mortgage market during the 1070s. They
held over 40 percent ofall home mortgages in
1980 as they did in 1968, and they accounted
for almost halfof the net increase in mortgages
outstanding over the period. But this was
increasingly against their will. Once inflation
began to accelerate, they could not finance their
portfolios of fixed-rate long-term mortgages with
short-term deposits, unless depositors would
accept below-market rates. The small saver
proved unwilling to subsidize the homebuyer,
ifalternative investments paying market rates
were available. Money market mutual funds
(MMMFs) were such an investment. Beginning
in 1972 the S&Ls’ cost of funds began to rise
relative to short-term Treasury rates.14 By 1980
the net income of the S&Ls as a whole was
approaching zero, tangible net worth was start-
ing to fall, and the industry had a net worth in
market value terms variously calculated to be
between -8 and -19 percent of its assets)5
Major legislation was enacted in 1980 and
1982 that liberalized both the asset and liability
sides of S&L balance sheets. The goal of saving
them as institutions took precedence over the
goal of promoting housing. They were allowed
to make loans and direct investments outside of
housing altogether, up to 40 percent oftheir
assets. Between 1980 and 1989, they accounted
for less than a quarter of the increase in out-
standing mortgages, and more than half oftheir
growth took the form of security purchases
rather than portfolio lending. By 1989 they held
only about 30 percent of outstanding mortgages
either in portfolio or as securities. Since the
passage of FIRREA, closure of failed S&Ls has
reduced the total poflfolio of the industry by
over $175 billion, and their share of the market
is iiiow under 20 percent.
The Evolution of the
Secondary Market
The dates in Table 1 a’so represent stages in
the evolution of the secondary market. Between
12 Between 1927 and 1929,40 percent of the S&Ls in Florida.
with almost ha’f of the assets, went out of business, while
S&Ls n the rest of the countrywere expanding. See
Bodfish (1931) for these data.
‘~For analyses of theprob}ems of the S&Ls during the 1970s
and 1980s, see Barth (1991) and White (1991); White was a
member of the Federal Home Loan Bank Board and Barth
was chief economist there during the late 1980s. Jones
(1979) describes the policy process during the 1970s. The
most extensive analysis of the secondary market is US.
Department of Housing and Urban Development (1987).
Weicher (1988) describes the changes in the system as a
whole and the devebp~ng problems that ed to the passage
of FIRREA.
14 The ELeventh District Cost of Funds rose from 9 basis points
below the three-month Treasury rate in 1972 to 61 basis
points above it in 1987, (The E’eventh D~str~ct FederaL
Home Loan Bank s located in San Francisco and thedistrict
indudes the states of Arizona! California and Nevada. Its
Cost of Funds, measuring the interest rate on deposits paki
by S&Ls in the district, is one of the common indices for
ARMs.)
~ See, for example, Brewer (1989), Brumbaugh (1988) and
Kane (1985). Brewer’s estimate is the lowest, Kane’s the
highest. Brunibaugh’s is -12.5 percent.
~fl~flA~ D~C~DW~ ~A~dV nc Ct fl~UC55
1968 and 1980, the secondary market took on its
present institutional structure, securitization
was invented, and the first mortgage securities
won market acceptance.
Two legislative changes—one in 1954 requir-
ing FNMA to buy mortgages on privately owned
low-income housing projects subsidized by the
government, and the other in 1967 treating the
purchases as a federal budget outlay—resulted
in splitting FNMA into two agencies in 1968
and changing its role.16 GNMA was created to
take responsibility for the low-income mort-
gages, and FNMA went off-budget as a federally
chartered corporation with agency status in the
capital markets.
In 1970, amid concerns about rising interest
rates and a new “credit crunch” in the primary
mortgage market as a result of Reg Q, policymakers
responded by turning to the secondary market.
In the Emergency Home Finance Act of 1970,
FNMA was given authority to buy conventional
mortgages as well as those guaranteed or insured
by the federal government. At the same time,
the S&Ls acquired their own federally chartered
secondary market facility, the Federal Home
Loan Mortgage Corporation (FHLMC). FHLMC
was supposed to buy the S&Ls’ current conven-
tional mortgage portfolios to “free up” funds for
new loans—in effect trying toshift the conse-
quences of monetary policy to other sectors
ofthe economy. Like the Home Loan Banks,
FHLMC was wholly owned by the S&Ls”
Thus, where there had been one secondary
market agency in 1967, there were three in 1970.
They had different ownership and they acted in
different ways.
GNMA operated as a secondary market agency
very much in the original intent of the New Deal
system. It did not buy and sell mortgages, but it
achieved the same result by issuing securities.
It created the first MBSs in 1970; by 1980 it was
securitizing virtually all new FHA and VA loans,
and its MBSs accounted for almost 10 percent of
all outstanding mortgages. FHLMC followed
GNMA into the securities business on a much
smaller scale and became primarily an issuer
of MI3Ss backed by conventional mortgages.
FNMAtook a different route. During the 1970s,
it turned itself into the largest conventional
mortgage portfolio lender and thus, in effect, the
largest S&L in the country, albeit with different
sources of hinds. Its experience paralleled that
of the S&Ls. It did not foresee the inflation of
the 1970s, so that its net worth also turned nega-
tive in the late 1970s: its 1980 value of -16 per-
cent was similar to the S&L industry,bB
During the lQBOs, securitization accounted
for overhalf the growth in the total volume
of mortgage credit. In 1981 both FNMA and
FHLMC initiated mortgage swap programs,
buying S&L portfolios and issuing pass-through
securities on exactlythe same mortgages in return.
This brought FNMAinto thebusiness of issuing
securities, rather belatedly. Since then, both
its portfolio and its MBS volume have grown
rapidly. Its outstanding MBSs are now 3.5
times the size of its portfolio, but it remains
the largest portfolio lender. Besides issuing
pass-throughs to S&Ls, FHLMC created the
CMO in 1983 and expanded its securities
business almost twentyfold.
FIRREA marks afurther stage in the evolution
of the secondary market. It turned FHLMC into
nearly a carbon copy of FNMA, giving it exactly
the same kind of board of directors and a very
similar charter. After FIRREA, the secondary
market institutions assumed a dominant position
in the mortgage market. Between 1968 and 1980,
about 80 percent of the net increase in mortgages
was held in portfolio and 20 percent was securi—
tized; since 1989 the proportions have been
IS Underthe 1967 federa’ budget reform, purchases of subs~-
dized mortgages were raising ouflays on a doUar-for~doliar
basis, even though part of the principal and nterest on the
mortgage would be paid to the government by the borrower.
Subsequent budgetreforms have changed this accourmng
practice. Undercurrent law, the entire principal amount of a
mortgage purchased or nsured by the federal government is
counted in the credit budget, but only the anticipated subsidy
is included as a ouflay in the administrative budget.
17 Opposition to aflowing FNMA to buy conventiona’ mortgages
was stated by Federa~ Reserve Chairman Martin n 1969
and opposition to creating FHLMC was stated by Federal
Reserve Chairman Burns in 1970. Martin expressed con-
cern that FNMA’s convenfional mortgage portfolio would be
illiquid and, therefore, might ult~mat&y disp’ace FNMA’s
holdings of FHA and VA mortgages, and also that FNMA’s
debt issuances would drive up merest rates and raisethe
cost of fundsto the S&Ls and other primary mortgage
enders. Burns raisedthe issue of ilhquidity and expressed
concern that FHLMC would drive up interest rates on FHA
and VA mortgages. See U.S. Department of Housing and
Urban Development (1987).
18 U.S. Department of Housing and Urban Development
(1987), basedon Kane and Foster (1986).56
reversed. GSE portfolios also continued to grow
as a share of the market.
Did the System “Work”After 1965?
Housing advocates opposed many of the policy
changes for fear they would weaken the ability
of the system to allocate credit to housing,
regardless of the consequences for the financial
system or the economy. This was the key concern
preventing financial reform in the 1970s: If the
S&Ls were allowed to diversify, who would “fill
the gap” in the mortgage market? This concern
proved to be unfounded. The secondary market
agencies filled the gap, as Table 1 shows, and
the volume of outstanding mortgages almost
tripled between 1980 and 1989.
A second concern was the cost ofmortgage credit.
This too has proved to belargely unfounded. The
spreads between mortgage and bond rates may
have widened during the 1970s and early 1980s,
but by the late 1980s the conventional mortgage
market may have become fufly integrated with
the capital markets)° Here also, the growing
role of the GSEs offset the declining presence of
the S&Ls, holding down the mortgage rate inthe
conforming loan market.
Regional differences in mortgages rates probably
disappeared by the mid-1980s, as a result of
securitization and deregulation. Available data
on interregional flows of mortgage funds suggest
that securitization resulted in transfers from the
Northeast and Midwest to the South and West,
where population and housing demand were
growing, and, as already noted, in 1983 the S&Ls
were allowed to make mortgage loans anywhere
in the country.2°The developing S&L crisis in
the 1980s also helped create a national mortgage
market. One way in which the Bank Board
handled failing S&Ls was to sell them for their
fr~mchise valueto other S&Ls—at first inthe same
market, then in the same state,then in other states,
as the number and severity of failures rose and
the financial resources ofthe FSLJCwere
increasingly inadequate.
The system had less success in achieving its
other purposes. Since 1965 the homeownership
rate has fluctuated in a fairly narrow range,
between 62 and 66 percent of all households 21
There was a notable increase among young
families during the 1970s, but this was simply
a result of inflation. Young families bought
homes as soon as they could because owning
a home was the best inflation hedge available,
especially as inflation pushed them into higher
marginal tax brackets. In the 1980s disinflation
and reductions in marginal tax rates caused
their homeownership rate to drop quickly back
to its 1970 level.
Housing cycles, like economic cycles in general,
became more pronounced. Record years of over
2 million housing starts annually in 1971-73
were followed by a postwar low in 1975; another
year of 2 million in 1978 was followedby new
lows in 1981 and 1982. The housing finance
system could not have been expected to offset
completely the effects of the oil shocks and
other macroeconomic changes, but it is doubtful
if it achieved its stated more modest objective of
mitigating their impact on housing and shifting
part ofthe consequences to other sectors. The
S&Ls used advances from the Home Loan Banks
to offset deposit outflows, and this may have
had some effect. FNMAmay also have mitigated
the cycles to a lesser extent through the late 1970s,
but it was not aggressively countercyclical, and it
may have had no effect in the recessions of 1980
19 Hendershott and Van Order (1989) conclude that the interest
rate on conventional, fixed-rate mortgages rose by about
100 basis points between the late 1970s and the mid-1980s,
compared to the rate that would have prevailed in a perfect
market; then II fefi byabout 50 basis points between 1986
and 1988 to the market rate. Other studies coveñng a shorter
pehod and compahng the mortgage and bond rates also find
that the conventiona’ mortgage rate began r~s~ng fl r&ative
terms sometime in the 1 970s, beforederegu~ation ot the S&Ls.
See, for exarnp~e.Kaufman (1981), Tucdllo, Van Order and
Villani (1982) and Hendershott, Shilling and ViMan~(1983).
The Hendershoti and Van Order study ends in 1988, and
there does not appear to be any more recent ana~ys~s of the
spread; given the year4o-year fiuctuat~onsn the spread
which they calculate, t wou’d be desirab~e to see more
recent data beforeconduding that the actua! conventional
conforming oan rate is the same as the rate in a pertecfly
competitive market. Cotterman (1994) notes that the spread
between the MBS and Treasury rates fluctuated between
1984 and 1990, and was at ts lowest evel in 1988 and 1990.
20 Rudolph. Zumpano and Karson (1982) find that interregional
interest rate differences stillexisted in the mid-1970s, while
Karson, Rudolph and Zumpano (1986) conclude that they
did not existby the mid-i980s. King and Andrukonis (1984)
reportthat FHLMC securities generated a gross transfer of
over $5 billion during their first decade. Informauon on net
interregional flows of mortgage funds is notavailabre, but
the existence of substanfial gross flows suggests that securi-
tization played a significant role in ePimiriating regional rate
differentia’s.
21 The difference in the trend after 1960 may be parily aftribut-
able todemographic changes, especially the increasing pro-
portion of households in categories n which homeownership
s less common, such as single ndividuajs and sing’e parents.57
and 198F82.22 FNMA’s purchases of conven-
tional mortgages dropped by about one4hird
from 1979 to 1981, which does not suggest that
it tried to act countercyclically.
Thus, even during this period of institutional
change and upheaval, the system continued to
allocate credit to housing, albeit at somewhat
higher mortgage rates, and a fully national mort-
gagemarket developed. But cyclical fluctuations
in housing were severe and the homeownership
ratestopped rising, raising the question ofwhether
the system was still achieving its basic purpose.
POLICY ISSUES: SAFETY AND
SOUNDNESS VS. PUBLIC PURPOSE
The housing finance system continues to
evolve. Congress has enacted three major laws
in the last five years, affecting every institution
in the system, and may consider further legisla-
tion for the Federal Home Loan Bank System.23
Some important provisions of these laws have
not yet been implemented; when they are, they
may in turn provoke further changes. The laws
have addressed two kinds of issues: policy mat-
ters—what purposes the system will genie and
how it will achieve them; and regulatory mat-
ters—what powers different institutions will
have and how they will be regulated.
In the policy area, all three new laws represent
abalancing ofpublic purpose against “safety and
soundness,” the implicit objective that the system
not impose direct costs on taxpayers that must be
met by legislated appropriations. In the wake of
the S&Ls’ problems, there has beena muchstronger
emphasis on safety and soundness; new capital
requirements have been imposed on most insti-
tutions within the system. But there are elements
in each law that concern the public purposes, and
there is some evidence that the pendulum maybe
swinging back toward a renewed emphasis on
these purposes. At the same time, some provi-
sions of the new laws may make it more difficult
to achieve them.
Safety and Soundness
The new laws raise capital standards and
take account of risk differentials among assets
for virtually all institutions within the housing
finance system. FIRREA imposed more stringent
capital requirements on the S&Ls. Theymust have
1.5 percent tangible capital relative to assets and
must meet the same risk-based capital standards
as national banks. The tangible net worth ofthe
S&Ls as a whole was only 0,7 percent in 1989.
Both FHA and the GSEs are required to hold
more capital than they had when the laws were
passed. The existing standards were not raised
so much as they were changed conceptually.
FHA had no specific capital standard, beyond
the legislative requirement that it be actuarially
sound, which was undefined. FNMA’s capital
requirement, established in its Charter Act, was
calculated as a debt-to-capital ratio. This meant
that itwas only required to hold capital against
its portfolio. Because it did not need to issue
debt to finance its MESs, FNMA’s capital-to-asset
ratio (including MBSs) was 1.1 percent in 1990.
Prior to FIRREA, FHLMC had no statutory capital
requirement; the Bank Board determined it as a
policy matter. FIRREA gave FHLMC the same
debt-to-capital standard as FNMA. With its larger
proportion of MBSs, its capital-to-asset ratio was
0.8 percent in 1990. These are quite low levels
of capital; had the GSEsbeen required to meet
the risk~basedcapital standards set for the S&Ls
in FIRREA, FNMA would have needed 2.5 times
as much capital as it actually had in 1990, and
FHLMC more than three times as much.24
Both the FHA and GSE standards are established
by “stress tests.” In other words, the entity must
22 See Grebler (1977) and Jaffee and Rosen (1979) for the
earlier cydes, and Kaufman (1985) forthe 1980-82 reces-
sions. Greb~eranalyzesboth Home Loan Bank advances
and FNMA purchases.
‘~The three laws are~FIRALA, concerning the S&Ls, the
Federal Home Loan Bank Board (which it abolished),
FHLMC, and to a easer extentthe Federal Home Loan
Banks: Title Sot the National Affordable Houshig Act of
1990, concerning FHA; and theFederal Housing Enterprises
Financial Safety and Soundness Act of 1992, enacted as
Title 13 ofthe Housing and Community Development Act of
1992, concerning FNMA and FHLMC. In addition, Congress
in 1992 required five separate studies of the Federal Home
Loan BankSystem as theprecursor tofuture legislation.
Four of these studies appeared during 1993, and the fifth in
April 1994. (The GSE legisIat~on in 1992 was enacted after
Congress required and received nine separate reports from
various federa~ government agencies.)
24 The calculations of these various capital ratios are reported
in U.S. Department of Housing and Urban Development
(1990a, 1990b). The published debt-to-capital ratios in the
reports include only stockholders’ equity; on that basis, the
ratios are 0.8 percent for FNMA and 0.6 percent for FHLMC.
Regulatory capital is defined in the Charter Acts to include
retained earnings arid subordinated debt. Subordinated
debt is not counted asequity under Generally Accepted
Accounting Princip’es because it takes precedence during
bankruptcy over ownership riterests. The subordinated debt
of the GSEs is due and payabfe in the event of bankruptcy
or insolvency, which appears to Umitthe government’s abHity
to r&y on it ascapital.58
have enough capital to survive a recession, with
the amount determined in advance by econo-
metric analysis. Both are risk-adjusted capital
standards; riskier loans are more likely to default
and more capital is required against them.
The FHA standard was set on the basis of an
actuarial study by Price Waterhouse during
1989-90. Price Waterhouse recommended that
FHA should at a minimum have a net worth of
1.25 percent against insurance in force, instead
of the then-current level of about 1.0 percent.
The purpose was to ensure that FHA would
have positive net worth in the event of a typical
post-war recession. This standard was enacted
in 1990, to be effectivein 1992, with a higher
standard of 2.0 percent in the year 2000. To
reach these targets, the insurance premium was
raised by about 70 percent, in present value
terms, and risk-related premiums were estab-
lished for the first time. Minimum equity
requirements for FHA homebuyers were also
raised, to reduce defaults and strengthen the
insurance hind; this increase, however, was
partly rolled back in 1992.25
The GSE stress test is based on their worst
actual regional experience, which for both has
been Texasin the mid-1980s. They are supposed
to have enough capital to withstand such a
recession if it occurred on the national level,
and also to survive large (600 basis points)
upward or downward changes in interest rates
occurring within a period of oneyear and lasting
for 10 years. Both mortgages held in portfolio
and MBSs are included.
The GSE capital standard includes more than
the stress test. It also defines two lower levels
ofcapital, in the form of ratios against mortgages
held in portfolio and MBSs. The authority of the
regulator varies depending on the GSE’s actual
capital relative to the levels defined in the statute.
The “minimum” capital level is 2,5 percent
against mortgages held in portfolio and 0.45 per-
cent against MESs, which matched FNMA’s
actual capital position as of 1991, and was slightly
more than FHLMC’s capital. (FHLMC was given
18 months to meet the minimum level without
incurring any regulatory sanctions, and it now
does.) The “critical” capital level is half of the
minimum level; if capital falls below it, the
regulator can immediately put the GSE into
receivership.
The GSEs’ risk-based capital standard is almost
certainly less stringent than the standard for
thrifts and banks, and the minimum standard
clearly is lower. Depository institutions must
have 4 percent capital against a mortgage in
their portfolio, while the GSEs must only have
2.5 percent. If a mortgage is securitized by the
GSEs and the security is held by a thrift or bank,
total capital is still less: 2.05 percent, consisting
of 1.6 percent for the depository institution to
protect against interest rate risk and 0.45 percent
for the GSE toprotect against credit risk.
The FHA and GSE standards were established
in very different ways. In the case ofFHA, an
econometric analysis was conducted and the
results were known before legislation was passed.
The law set new parameters for FHA insurance
partly on the basis of whether they would enable
FHA to achieve the standard. In the case ofthe
GSEs, the stress test is prescribed as much as
possible in the statute, but it was not performed
before the bill was passed. Instead, it was nego-
tiated between the Bush Administration and the
GSEs and written into law by Congress without
analysis ofhow much capital will be required to
meet it. The test must be formally stated in reg-
ulations by November 1994, and does not
become effective for another year.
Capital standards for the Federal Home Loan
Banks may be the subject of legislation in the
near future. Their capital now consists only of
the stock that S&Ls and other institutions have
had to buy in order to be members of the Home
Loan Bank System and to obtain advances.
Members can withdraw from the System and sell
25 The 1990 egis~ation required FHA mortgagorsto have at
east 2.25 percent equity in their home when they bought it
(1.25 percent for mortgages under $50,000). Previously, it
was possib’e to buy a home with no real equfty, because
buyers were allowed to finance the closing costs n their
mortgage. On loans betow $50,000, the minimum down
payment is 3 percent; on loans over $50,000, it s 3 percent
of the first $25,000and 5 percent over $25,000. C’osing
costs average 2 to 3 percent, ranging up to 6 percent n a
few states. The down payment n effect paid the closing
costs for a substanflal number of FHA-insured homebuyers.
For analysis of the r&ationship between defaults and initial
loan-to-value rafios, showing a strong positive corretation,
see Price Waterhouse (1990) and Hendershott and Schultz
(1993), and the hterature cited therein. For a more detailed
d~scuss~on of the 1990 FHA egislaUon, see Weicher (1992).59
their stockback to their Home Loan Bank, subject
to an advance notice requirement ofsix months.
Thus, it is problematic whether the capital wonid
be available ifindividual HomeLoan Banks begaxi
to incur losses. The members have an incentive,
and a right, to withdraw their capital just when
it is most needed.
But the Home Loan Banks have solittle capital
because of public policy. They had $2 billion in
retained earnings until FIRREA took that money
to cover part of the cost of S&L failures. FIRREA
also required them to contribute $300 million
per year out of their future earnings. That is
why the oniy capital they now have is the stock
owned by the members. It is going to be difficult
to build capita’ through new retained earnings.
Even ifCongress were to repeal the $300 million
annual contribution, the S&Ls and probably the
newer members are likely to prefer having this
money passed through as dividends rather than
remaining as retained earnings, which could be
taken away again. In their studies of the Home
Loan Banks, both the General Accounting Office
and the Clinton Administration have argued that
they need more capital, but neither has offered a
specific proposal for raising it.
Countercyclical Support for
Housing Construction
The emphasis on safety and soundness creates
a clear potential conflict with the traditional
countercyclical objective ofthe housing finance
system. This is most obvious with respect to the
GSEs, where it was explicitly discussed in eva!-
uating the adequacy oftheir present capital. In
its annual reports as regulator of FNMA and
FHLMC prior to legislative consideration of a
new capital standard, HUD used a Depression
scenario to assess capital adequacy, based on
one used by Moody’s to rate private mortgage
insurers. HUD concluded that neither GSE could
survive 10 years of the Depression scenario, but
both could last six years.25 This analysis
assumed that they continued to be active in the
mortgage market during the Depression to the
same extent as previously; FNMA and FHLMC
could survive a full 10 years ofthe Depression
scenario, ifthey immediately suspended opera-
tions at the beginning of the Depression. In
response, the GSEs stated that they would in
fact cease buying mortgages immediately.27
This, of course, raises the question of whether
they could recognize the onset of a depression
immediately (a delay of two years would be
enough to cut the period of survival from 10 to
six years for both GSEs). The 1992 legislation
accepted the GSEposition on at least an interim
basis. The stress test must assume that the GSEs
accept no new business until the General
Accounting Office and Congressional Budget
Office complete studies of the appropriate new
business assumptions. The studies are due in
November 1995. The GSEs have also saidthey
would increase theirguarantee fees if necessary
to remain solvent, but it is not easy to raise
prices during a recession.
It should be possible fora GSE to buy mortgages
in periods of high interest rates, earn a profit if
rates decline, and perhaps moderate fluctuations
in housing production in the process. The
opportunity to profit from interest rate declines
is limited, but not eliminated, by the prepayment
option. On the other hand, countercyclical
behavior may result in credit risk. Ifthe quality
distribution of loans offered in a recession is the
same as during an expansion, then it is necessary
to buy lower quality mortgages in order to be
actively countercyclical.
The potential conflict has been discussed in
every downturn. The legislative changes probably
heighten it. The GSEs still have Charter Act
responsibilities to “provide ongoing support to
the mortgage market,” but a capital standard that
assumes they do not.
28 These results are for 1991 as reported in U.S. Department
of Housing and Urban Development (1992a, 1992b). Similar
tests for 1990 show that FHLMCcould survive six years and
FNMAseven (U.S. Department of Housing and Urban
Devetopment, 1991b). The 1991 test is more detailed and
sophisticated. The test is stringent: It includes a 10 percent
decline in houseprices forfour straight years, for example.
It is necessary to survive 10 years of the Moody’s
Depression scenario to qualify for an AAA rating; very few
financial institutions are rated AAA. The HUD stress test is
nol identicat to the Moody’s scenario,aithough ft is clos&y
modeled on the scenario. Thus, ft cannot be said that the
GSEs wou’d or woufd not receive an AAA rating from
Moody’s, or conversely that any other financial insfitution
would or would not survive 10 years of the HIJD stress test.
An AAA rating is not Ukely, however. In 1991 Standard and
Poor’s evaluated both GSEs at the request of the Treasury,
rating FHLMC as A+ and FNMA as A~ on the assumption that
the GSEs did not have agency status. which in fact they do.
27 The reaction of the GSEs appears in U.S. Department of
Housing and Urban Development (1991b).60
At present these issues are hypothetical, but
in a severe downturn they would become real.
They would then attract policymakers’ attention
and perhaps result in further changes.
“Underserved” Areas and Groups
The traditional goal ofmaking mortgage credit
equally available across the country has taken
new forms in FIRREA and the GSE legislation.
The focus of concern has shifted from regions to
communities, particularly low-income urban
neighborhoods and those with predominantly
minority residents, arid also toindividuals.
Explicit subsidies through the housing finance
system are being provided and proposed to meet
this goal. FIRREA required the Home Loan
Banks to subsidize low-income housing directly
by allocating 20 percent of their profits to a new
Affordable Housing Program, with a minimum
annual amount starting at $50 million and
increasing to $100 million by 1995. This is
essentially another tax on the Home Loan Banks
and through them the S&Ls. The Clinton
Administration’s report on the Home Loan Bank
System goes further and proposes a specific
mandate to facilitate mortgage lending to lower-
income families and targeted populations. This
would he a new role for the Home Loan Banks.
Support for low- and moderate-income housing
has been one of the purposes of FNMA and
FHLMC, as stated in their Charter Acts.28 This
became the major Congressional concern in
1992, once the Administration and the GSEs
agreed on a capital standard. The law sets two
general goals that certain percentages (to be
determined by the HUB Secretary) should be for
units occupied by families with incomes below
median, and forhousing in central cities. Both
goals include rental housing as well as homes.29
The law allows a number of acceptable reasons
for not meeting any goal in a given year, and a
multi-year regulatory process before any sanc-
tions could be imposed for falling short.
The law also sets transition goals. Each GSE
is to have at least 30 percent of its purchases for
housing occupied by familiesbelow median
income by 1994, rising in two steps from their
1992 levels. This is about the share of the con-
ventional conforming loan market consisting of
buyers in this income range. The GSEs have not
come very close tothis percentage in the past for
single-family houses; both were below 25 percent
in 1991. Nearly all apartments, however, are
affordable by families of median income by the
rules ofthumb set forth in the legislation. Both
GSEs met the 1993 targets established by HUD.
Similar transition goals were established for
central cities, and in this case neither GSEmet
the 1993 goal. Under HUD’s regulations they
are now required to file housing plans to describe
how they will meet them in the future.
These housing goals pose another potential
conflict between the safety and soundness of the
housing finance system (and also the financial
interests ofthe private and quasi-private housing
finance institutions) and a public purpose which
is becoming increasingly prominent. Both the
GSEs and the Home Loan Banks have pointed
out the conflict. The issue is more serious for
the Home Loan Banks because they must fund
the Affordable Housing Program. This require~
mont, like the $300 million contribution to the
cost of S&L resolutions, has been used by the
Home Loan Banks to justify making investments
with the funds that they borrow on the capital
markets as the demand for advances has fallen,
and thus perhaps to undertake new types of risk.
FNMA and FHLMC are required onlyto buy
loans for moderate-income housing, not to pro-
vide subsidies, and they need not lower their
underwriting standards. The general conclusion
of the mortgage default literature is that default
is largely a function of the loan-to-value ratio on
the mortgage and not closely related to either
the value of a home or the income of the buyer.~°
But even if moderate-income housing turned out
28 Both GSEs are required “to provide ongoing assistance to
the secondary marketfor residentia’ mortgages (including
activities relating to mortgages on housing for ow- and
moderate-income tandies invofving a reasonabieeconomt
return that may be less than the return earned on other
actMties) See 12 U.S.C. § 1716.
20 The law a~so sets a special affordable housing go& that
1 percent of each GSE’s purchases should be for housing
affordab~e to low-income familiesor ocated in ow-income
neighborhoods, with allocated shares for s~ngIe-famiIy and
multifamily housing.
~° See Hendershott and Schultz (1993) and theliterature cited
therein. Hendershott and Schultz do find that foreclosures
on FHA-insured loansare irlvers&y relatedto loan size,
which they attribute to differential underwrftingstandards or
house price appreciation rates. The latter explanation might
ndicate greater risk forsmall loans.
ctfltC*~ nCt~t~~tnrt~nMt( flt CT fl~OC61
to be riskier, it would be possible for the GSEs to
take more risk than the S&Ls, given their lower
cost of funds. The charter acts and the legislation
seemto expect thatthe GSEs will use their agency
status to make loans to moderate-income buyers,
without jeopardizing their safety and soundness.
The Administration’s proposed lower-income
mandate for the Home Loan Banks takes a similar
view, stating that collateral requirements should
not be relaxed to meet the mandate.
REGULATORY ISSUES
The Struclvre of Regulation
At the same time that capital standards were
being raised for most entities within the system,
all of the private institutions were given new
regulators. The Bank Board was abolished and
its duties parcelled out among several agencies.
Some of the potential conflicts between public
purpose and safety and soundness are reflected
in the new regulatory structure. The 1992 GSE
legislation divided authority betweenthe Secretary
of HUll) and the Director of a new Office of
Federal Housing Enterprise Oversight (OFHEO),
which is formally part of HUD but is effectively
independent ofthe Secretary. The Director reg-
ulates for safety and soundness; the Secretary
establishes, monitors, and enforces the housing
goals and regulates the GSEs in all areas other
than safety and soundness. For example, the
Secretary rather than the Director approves new
programs, and the Secretary rather than the
Director raised the issue ofwhether the GSEs
had toreduce their maximum mortgage amount
when the conforming loan limit declined last
year. The effectiveness ofthis relationship has
not yet been tested, since the Office is still in the
formative stage and has not yet had to issue any
of the regulations required by the law.
Both the GAO and the Administration studies
of the Home Loan Banks have recommended
that they be regulated by OFHEO. At present
they are regulated by the Federal Housing
Finance Board, created in FIRREA as an after-
thought for that sole purpose. The ostensible
reason for abolishing the Bank Board was that it
acted as an advocate for the industry it was sup-
posed to regulate. The risk that the regulated
entities would capture the regulator would seem
to be still greater for the Federal Housing
Finance Board, with nothing to do but regulate
the 12 Home Loan Banks, and for OFHEO, regu-
lating only the two GSEs. It is probably prefer-
able to have one regulator for all 14 institutions,
rather than two, although FNMA and FHLMC do
not favor sharing their regulator. Whether that
proposal is adopted, it seems likely that the reg-
ulatory structure of the system will be revised
again.
Is There A Future for Specialized
Portfolio Lenders?
Public policy has wrestled for two decades
with the question ofwhether specialized mort-
gage portfolio lenders can exist. In the 1970s
policymakers decided they could and tried to
keep the S&Ls operating as they always had in
the face of inflation and new competition. In
the 1980s policy reversed itself, and S&Ls were
given broad new asset powers. In the 1990s
policy has reversed itself again. FIRREA adopted
the premise that deregulation caused the S&L
failures, a view not shared by most economists.3’
It explicitly took away some of the powers gnmted
in 1980-82 and required S&Ls to put a higher
percentage of their assets in mortgages and
housing investments to keep their tax advantages,
although the latter restriction was somewhat
relaxed in 1991.32 S&Ls are not forced to be sp&-
cialized housing portfolio lenders, however; the
new capital rules give them an incentive to
move away from portfolio lending by requiring
only 40 percent as much capital against MBSs
issued by the GSEs as against whole mortgages.
31 White (1991) favorsderegulation, but says it came 15 years
too ate and should have been accompanied by stronger
safety and soundness regulation, and by risk-adjusted
deposit insurance premiums. He reviews the Oterature
showing that losses were posillvSy relatedto useof the new
powers. Barth (1991) favorsderegulation but says that it
contributed to the problems of some S&Ls. Kane (1989)
argues that deregufation did not cause the problems of S&Ls
and re-regulation would not solve them, but goes on to say
that deregulation expanded opportunities for poor’yman-
aged S&ls to fail, aswell as allowkig weD-managed ones to
rebuild their net worth. Rudolph (1989) analyzed the subse-
quent behavior of S&Ls that were insolvent in 1982 and
found that trathtional hous~ngenderswere more likely to be
insolvent in 1982-83, but less ikely fl 1986, which suggests
that among insolvent S&Ls, at least, those taking advantage
ofthe new powers were ess successfu~ than those which
stayed in housing.”
32 White (1991) notes, however, that at the same fime these
provisions were enacted, many members of Congress were
saying that S&Ls should be more like commercial banks.62
Meanwhile, the GSEs are thriving in part
becausethey are specialized lenders—very large
S&Ls, in that sense—as well as secondary market
agencies. Their portfolio operations are quite
profitable: Almostthree-quarters of FNMA’s
revenue, and almost half of FHLMC’s, came
from their portfolios in 1992. FHLMC has recog-
nized this since FIRREA gaveit the same powers
and incentives as FNMA; it is behaving similarly,
expanding its portfolio by 70 percent and an-
nouncing abusiness objective of further rapid
growth. FHLMC was already the fourth largest
portfolio lender in the United States, although
its portfolio always has been small relative to its
securities volume. The specialized portfolio
lender is alive and functioning to a greater
extent than is generally recognized.
Several factors contribute to the GSEs’ success
as portfolio lenders. A number of recent studies
conclude that the 20 to 35 basis point difference
between the conforming market and the jumbo
market is the margin between profit and loss for
S&Ls, on average. The cost advantage of the
GSEs is attributed to the lower capital require-
ments they face, the tax exemptions and smaller
regulatory burdens granted them by their federal
charters, the factthat they do not have to pay
deposit insurance premiums or help to fund the
resolution of failed S&Ls, and economies of sca1e.~
The first two factors are benefits conferred
explicitly by act of Congress.
Macroeconomic conditions may also con-
tribute to the GSEs’ recent success. If inflation
is erratic and unanticipated, it is probably not
possible to survive as a specialized portfolio
lender, as ENMA and the S&Ls showed during
the 1970s and early lOBOs. Ifinflation is low
and stable, it is apparently still possible to be a
specialized portfolio lender, as the same institu-
tions showed when inflation receded after 1982
and both FNMAand a large number of S&Ls
became profitable once again. FNMA especially
was saved by disinflation. It gambled on a
decline in interest rates (there was not much to
lose from such a gamble, from the stockholders’
point of view), buying mortgages in large vol-
ume, and it benefitted greatly when rates fell.
Its net worth became positive in 1985. It has
tried to prevent a similar problem in the future.
A HUD analysis in 1991 concluded that it has
~ See Cotterman (1994) and McNultyand Pearce (1994) for
discussions of the literature. Goodman and Passmore (1992)
caIcu~atethat the difference in capit& requirements alone
owers the OSEs’ costs by about 35 basis points.
effectively hedged against interest rate risk by
changing the duration of its liabilities, even
though most ofits portfolio consists of fixed-rate
mortgages.
It is doubtful if S&Ls could do the same thing,
given their higher costs. They may be able to
prosper as portfolio lenders specializing to some
extent in fixed-rate mortgagesby accepting inter.
est rate risk, if inflation remains low and if the
yield curve remains upward sloping. They may
also survive as ARM lenders.
The broader geographic authority ofthe GSEs
may have been important in the 1980s. S&L fail-
ures since deregulation have been concentrated
in states which suffered severe recessions,
notably Texas but also other energy and farm
states. The decline in domestic crude oil prices
between 1982 and 1989 precipitated a regional
recession in which commercial real estate val-
ues in the Southwest fell by one-third. (Over
the same period, they rose nationally by about
10 percent.) Defaults on home mortgages and
other real estate rose rapidly. The geographic
restrictions on S&L portfolios meant that the bad
investments and loans were held in the portfo-
has of institutions in those states. One-fifth of
the S&Ls which failed during the lOSOs were
located in Texas and they accounted for half of
the losses. Deposit insurance turned the region-
al failures into a national problem.
It is now possible for an S&L, like a GSE, to
make or buy loans anywhere in the country.
This may be significant. Both FNMA and FHA
survived the Texas recession and other regional
problems during the mid-lQBOs. Both sustained
losses, but neither was driven to a negative net
worth position. Their experience suggests that
national portfolio lenders—in effect, national
S&Ls—could be viable. But the cost advantages
of the GSEs would remain.
GSE Powers
The competitive advantages conferred on the
GSEs by agency status raise the question of their
role as potential competitors in markets beyond
their current activities. This has been a recurring
issue for FNMAsince it was privatized, whenthe
Secretary of FEUD was givennew programapproval
authority. It has become an issue for FHLMC
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since FIRREA. Typically, FNMA has sought
legislative authority from Congress if the Secretary
has denied or deferred approval. Usually, but
not always, Congress has given approval.
The most contentious instance is REMICs. The
Tax Reform Act of 1986 created these securities
and authorized FNMA and FHLMC to issue
REMICs backed by conventional mortgages,
subject to the approval of their regu1ators.~
Both agencies sought approval, over the strong
objections of Wall Street securities issuers, who
argued that they could enter this market ifthe
agencies did not, but could not compete with
them. The Federal Home Loan Bank Board
originally decided not to allow FHLMC to issue
REMICS, but HUD (under pressure from
Congress) eventually allowed FNMA to issue
them on a temporary basis, which became per-
manent in 1988, and FHLMC was allowed to
issue them in 1988.
FNMA has also sought to move beyond mortgage
purchase and securitization, with less success.
In 1985 it proposed to buy bonds collateralized
by mortgages that would be issued by financing
subsidiaries of financial institutions. In 1990 it
requested approval of a program to buy debt
obligations secured by conventional mortgages,
or securities hacked by such mortgages. The
former proposal brought objections from invest-
ment bankers and the Senate Banking Committee
chairman and ranking minority member, as being
financing transactions ratherthan mortgage pur-
chases, and HUD did not approve it. The latter
would have placed FNMA in competition with
the Home Loan Banks by ‘etting it issue advances
against mortgage collateral, and HUD again
denied approva1.~~
FNMA has also undertaken or considered
activities that are ancillary to its secondary market
operations but that are already provided by private
firms. In the mid-1980s, it raised the possibility
ofestablishing a mortgage insurance subsidiary,
in competition with the private mortgage insur-
ance industry. In 1985 it acquired a computer
software firm with the intent of producing and
selling a loan origination and servicing program.3°
The GSEs have strongly opposed any regulatory
limitation on their powers. This was a major issue
in the 1992 legislation. Ultimately, the HUD
Secretary retained the authority to deny approval
for a new program ifhe or she determines that
the program is “not in the public interest,” but
the Secretary has to act within 45 days, and the
law prescribes an appeals process which is
heavily weighted toward the GSEs. The law
also gives the GSEs broad authority to buy any
kind of home mortgage, limiting the Secretary’s
regulatory discretion.~~ There is no reason to
think that the GSEswill not attempt to extend
their activities in the future, so the demarcation
of authority between different institutions will
probably continue to be a recurring issue.
CONCLUSION
One public policy issue which appears to be
resolved is the desirability of a housing finance
system to allocate credit to housing. This is a
change from recent years. For about a decade
beginning in the late 1970s, there was extensive
public discussion about dismantling the system
on the grounds that it was becoming too expen-
sive for society to continue allocating credit to
housing, in two senses. Household investment
in housing was growing rapidly in response to
REMICs have tax advantages over CMOs and were expected
to be a majorinnovafion in mortgage securWes.
~ HUD alsodenied approva’ on groundsthat the program
nvo$ved significant risks to all parUes, nclud~ng the federal
government, and could adversely affect FNMA’s safety and
soundness since it could affect FNMAs needsfor capitaL
The transactionswould have allowed financial institutions
to defer recognition of economic losses and encourage
everaging, possibly ncreas~ng the risk of bankruptcy by
theinstituUon. Deniaf of new programs on safety and
soundness grounds has been relativ&y infrequent.
36 The regulatory issues raised by new acUv~t~es between 1980
and 1985 are described in U.S. Department of Housing and
Urban Development (1987), the propos&to purchase debt
obligations secured byconvention& mortgages in U.S.
Department of Housing and Urban Dev&opment (1991a).
~ In 1970 FNMA sought and received regulatory approval from
Secretary George Romney to begin a program of buying
convenflon& firstmortgages on s~ng~e-family homes. At the
time, virtuafly the only conventiona’ mortgages ssued were
standard mortgages. As new nstruments were developed
in the 1980s, FNMA claimed the authority to buy any kind
of conventiona’ first mortgage under the“Romney letter”
such as ARMs and bafloon mortgages with different hsk
characteristics than the standard mortgage. Proposed HUD
regulations ssued in 1990 would have revoked this broad
nterpretation. FNMA objected to theregu~aflons,and they
were superseded by the 1992 legislation.64
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